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Abstract  
The authors systematize the economic-mathematical models, as well as the results of empirical studies of 
authoritative international analytical agencies and financial institutions, in which the influence of state capital 
in the banking system on the development of national economies was formalized on different countries in 
different periods. The analysis showed that such studies often give some completely opposite results. The 
reason for these authors is that the sample of countries in these models is formed mainly taking into account 
differences in the scale of state participation and levels of economic development of countries. This approach 
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these countries and the functions performed by the state banks. 
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Introduction 
Most economic studies of the late twentieth century are devoted to research problems of state banks as from 
a commercial point of view, and in the context of a possible imbalance in the allocation of public financial 
resources, rising politicization of the banking sector, reducing the quality of financial intermediation more. 
As a result of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, many countries of the world (including Ukraine) were 
forced to nationalize problematic private banks, which increased the share of state property in banking systems 
(for example, in countries with world leaders - from 7.3% in 2007 to 10.8% in 2009). The above-mentioned 
circumstances gave a new impetus to the revival of scientific discussions on the functions of banks with state 
participation in the economy, the mechanisms for their functioning and place in the financial system. 
Fundamentals study the influence of banks with state participation in the development of countries' economies 
inherent in scientific research works such as John. Bart T. Beck, G. Huizinha E. Demirguc-Kunt, S. Zervos, 
L. Zinhales A. Andrews , J. Caprio, T. Kerner, R. King, R. Levin, N. Loyaz, M. Martínez Peria, F. Lopez-de-
Silanes, R. La Porta, A. Schleifer, I. Schnebel et al. The synthesis of scientific literature on the studied issues 
allows us to argue that there is no single point of view on the impact (positive or negative) of banks with state 
participation on economic growth and the development of national economies. 
Methods and findings 
In the process of solving the research tasks put forward by the authors in the article, the following methods of 
analysis, synthesis and logical generalization were used; comparative analysis − in analyzing the functioning 
of banking systems of countries of the world with different levels of state participation in banks’ capital; 
correlation and regression analysis − in assessing the impact of state banks on the level of socio-economic 
development of the country. 
Here are the arguments and the results of the research carried out to confirm the negative impact of state 
capital in the banking system on economic growth and the development of the national economy: 
 Increasing the presence of the state in the financial sector leads to a reduction in the degree of availability 
of credit resources for business entities (this conclusion is confirmed by studies (La Porta, 1999), in which 
this degree of accessibility is determined on the basis of calculation of that share of loans to private companies 
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that are not included in the twenty largest enterprises, as well as using the general analytical indicator of the 
availability of credit resources); 
 an increase in the state’s presence in the banking system leads to a decrease in the efficiency of its 
functioning (this conclusion is confirmed by studies (La Porta, 1999), which established the relationship 
between the volume of state capital in the banking system and indicators such as: the ratio of indirect costs 
and total assets, between interest rates on deposits and loans); 
 the increase in the proportion of banks with public participation in the banking system reduces its financial 
stability and stability (this conclusion is confirmed by studies (La Porta, 1999), which established the 
relationship between the volume of state capital in the banking system and indicators such as: inflation, an 
integrated indicator of financial stability banks, also the share of troubled assets, etc.); 
 an increase in the share of banks with state participation in the banking system reduces the growth rate of 
productivity of the financial sector adjusted for the corresponding increase of capital (this conclusion is 
confirmed by researches (Beck,Crivelli, 2005; Beck. Levine , 2000; King, 1993; La Porta, Lôpez-de-Silanes, 
2002; Rajan, 1998); 
 significant state involvement in the banking sector correlates with a low level of financial intermediation 
(this conclusion is confirmed by studies (Beck,Crivelli, 2005; Beck. Levine , 2000; King, 1993; La Porta, 
Lôpez-de-Silanes, 2002; Rajan, 1998); 
 an increase in the share of state participation in the banking system leads to imbalances in the allocation of 
financial resources of the state. This is due to the possibility of combining state ownership of banks with the 
government’s desire to finance inefficient but politically significant projects, which are often devoid of 
positive value for the society of states (this conclusion is confirmed by researches Levy Yeyati , Micco, 2004); 
 the efficiency of state banks is much lower compared to commercial private banks, which in turn leads to a 
slowdown in economic growth of the country, which is especially relevant for countries with economies in 
transition and underdeveloped countries (this conclusion is confirmed by researches Levy Yeyati, Micco, 2004); 
 the existence of banks with state participation enables the state to control the investment decisions of 
financial institutions, based solely on political motives (this conclusion is confirmed by studies (Beck,Crivelli, 
2005; Beck, Levine, 2000; King, 1993; La Porta, Lôpez-de-Silanes, 2002; Rajan, 1998); 
 state banks may be required (either in the form of direct directives or indirectly, through appropriate 
regulatory influence) to finance inefficient state-owned enterprises, to provide financing to borrowers in 
certain regions / sectors of the economy under non-market conditions, to pursue a credit policy based on 
political motives and priorities. 
 The arguments and the results of the research carried out to confirm the positive influence of the state 
capital in the banking system on economic growth and development of the national economy: 
 increasing the presence of the state in its financial sector provides stable rates of development of financial 
intermediation, namely: development of lending by state banks of private enterprises and development of new types 
of financial and economic cooperation − subsidization of commercial banks, standardized contracts, more efficient 
lending to sectors of the national economy, construction systems of additional guarantees for banks subject to the 
development of long-term lending, etc. (This conclusion is confirmed by research (Demirguc-Kunt, 2000; 
Demirguc-Kunt, Maksimovic, 1998; Gershenkron, 1962)); 
  the presence of a state in the banking system generally increases its financial stability, as financial and 
credit institutions dependent on borrowed funds in the form of financial resources deposits may face a 
significant outflow problem with the insignificant role of the state in the financial system, which, on a 
macroeconomic scale, may lead to the deterioration of financial stability and stability of both banks and the 
entire banking system. In addition, the state is a certain stabilizing factor that in some way protects commercial 
banks from the influence of external negative factors (this conclusion is confirmed by researches Levy Yeyati, 
Micco, 2004); 
 an increase in the share of banks with state participation in the banking system reduces the imperfection of 
the financial markets of the country (this conclusion is confirmed by researches Levy Yeyati, Micco 2004, 
Lewis, 1955; Myrdal, 1971); 
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 publicly-owned banks provide investment in financial resources in socially meaningful but ineffective 
projects in terms of profit. This opens up new opportunities for the state to overcome the institutional 
inefficiency of private capital markets, stimulate aggregate supply in the market, which in the long run 
stimulates the pace of economic growth of the state. (this conclusion is confirmed by researches Levy Yeyati, 
Micco, 2004, Lewis, 1955; Myrdal, 1971); 
 state capital in the banking system stimulates the development of the financial sector as a whole (this 
conclusion is confirmed by researches Levy Yeyati, Micco, 2004, Myrdal, 1971); 
 a significant factor influencing the state's presence in the banking system is the possibility of financing 
projects at those stages of economic cycles in which commercial banks can not or do not want to do so. Most 
clearly this occurs during an economic recession in the country, or if such projects involve significant external 
risks or if the financial and economic potential of individual regions of the state is not within the scope of the 
interests of private banking capital (this conclusion is confirmed by studies Levy Yeyati, Micco, 2004); 
 significant participation of the state in the banking system has a positive effect on the efficiency of the 
banking business (this conclusion is confirmed by researches (Levy Yeyati, Micco, 2004, Myrdal, 1971)); 
 an increase in the share of the state in capital or assets of the banking system has a positive effect on the 
expansion of production and employment of the population (this conclusion is confirmed by researches (Levy 
Yeyati, Micco, 2004, Myrdal, 1971); 
 significant participation of the state in the banking system contributes to leveling the levels of economic 
development of potentially unprofitable sectors of the economy (this conclusion is confirmed by researches) 
(Levy Yeyati, Micco, 2004, Myrdal, 1971); 
 state-owned banks, using the reputation of more reliable and stable institutions, can attract significant 
amounts of financial resources, thereby improving the quality of financial intermediation; 
 an increase in the share of banks with state participation in the banking system makes it less vulnerable to 
the expansion of foreign capital; 
 the scale of state participation in the banking system has a positive impact on the gross income per capita, 
as well as investment activity (gross investment in fixed assets); 
 Public-sector banks play an important role in stabilizing loans during the economic cycle and during periods 
of financial instability, which allows for the use of an increase in state participation in the banking system as 
a temporary short-term countercyclical instrument. World Bank experts have proved that a 1% increase in the 
GDP growth rate is caused by a 2.0% increase in lending rates for private banks, and only 0.6% by state banks. 
This means that the purpose of state banks is to stabilize loans during the economic cycle, and not simply 
maximize profits (this conclusion is confirmed by research, the results of which are illustrated in Table 1). 
Analysis of the data presented in Table. 1, it is possible to conclude that the process of lending to business 
entities by state banks is stable during the business cycle in cases where the bank is in a country with a high 
level of efficiency index of public administration. The quality of public administration is a key aspect in 
ensuring the implementation of the function of stabilizing general lending by state banks during the economic 
cycle. In developing countries, loans of state banks are less pro-cyclical character than loans of private banks. 
Loans of state banks in developed countries were also less procyclical than private bank loans, we can even 
conclude their anti-cyclical nature. 
Thus, state-owned banks perform better the function of stabilizing overall credit activity in developed 
countries, since the ability of state-owned banks to stabilize loans is most in demand during the period of the 
financial crisis. Research shows that public banks are increasing their loans is during banking crises, as 
opposed to the reduction of credit activity of private banks. 
Greater stability of state banks’ loans during the economic cycle implies more stable financing. During the 
economic boom state banks require less additional funds for further lending. The analysis showed that state 
banks are increasing non-depozitory sources of funding only during a relatively small period of economic 
boom. The low dependence of state-owned banks on non-deposit financing in the period of economic upsets 
partly explains the fact that they maintain lending levels during recessions. 
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The analysis of the relationship between the level of non-performing state bank loans and the level of lending 
activity suggests that state banks show a lower level of problem loans compared to private banks during 
periods of economic growth, and vice versa. It smoothes the capital base of state-owned banks, as well as their 
ability to provide new loans, compared to private banks (Myrdal 1971). 
Among the issues that researchers are investigating within the framework of the functioning of state banks is 
also an analysis of their impact on the country's economic development, with the level of public participation 
and degree of protection of property rights are the most significant problems in this context. However, despite 
the significant amount of research, scientists could not clearly determine the effect of state banks on economic 
development. 
The generalization of the above arguments about the positive or negative impact of the state's participation in 
the banking system on economic growth suggests that studies conducted by reputable and well-known 
specialists in this area often give absolutely opposite results. Thus, it is logical to assume that the problem is 
not in the form of research or incorrect economic logic, which is the basis for interpreting these results. 
In our opinion, the reason for such diametrically opposed conclusions about the impact of banks with state 
participation on economic growth and the development of national economies is the failure to consider the 
mathematical models of the specifics of the countries under study. Therefore, none of the above arguments 
can be fair to any country. We believe that the effects of state presence in the banking system is not uniform 
for all sample countries not to suggest the magnitude and even the direction of this action clearly demonstrated. 
Thus, the size of the state's participation in the financial sector of the country is a determining factor in the 
impact on its development, and a certain list of specific characteristics of the financial sector itself. The effect 
of increasing the fate of the state's participation in the banking system of the country on the indicators of its 
economic development (in particular, on GDP growth per capita) depends strongly on the level of 
development of the banking system itself, in particular, on the quality of functioning of financial institutions, 
the bank's banking system. 
In countries with underdeveloped financial sector and low quality of functioning of political institutions, the 
negative impact was rather significant, but it gradually declined with the development of the financial sector. 
Therefore, under other conditions, with the financial sector reaching a certain level of its development and in 
the absence of the possibility of political forces through state banks to ensure the fulfillment of their private 
interests, the effect of increasing the state presence was absent or even positive. 
In general, agreeing with the thesis that the impact of state-owned bank capital on the development of the 
national economy will be different for countries with different levels of financial sector development, we 
believe that, besides this, this influence also significantly depends on the functions assigned to state-owned 
banks. 
On this basis, we propose to adequately test the hypothesis about the influence of the state's participation in 
the banking system on the development of the national economy to formulate a sample of countries not 
according to the criterion of different amounts of state participation in banks' capital, but according to the 
criterion of different functional load of banks with state participation in the banking system and the national 
the economy as a whole. Thus, the fundamental difference between the approach that will be set out in this 
section of the dissertation research, from the other, which has become widespread in the scientific literature, 
is the orientation towards the target benchmarks in the activity of the state-controlled banks. 
Based on the difference in the construction of a corporate governance system in public and private banks, they 
have a diversified and multidirectional impact on the development of the national economy. The main 
functional task of a commercial bank is to maximize its profit, and thus, the creation and implementation of 
an effective system for collecting, systematizing and analyzing information about potential clients, as well as 
diversifying activities, target groups and markets is one of the priorities of the management of such a bank. In 
the case where the bank's owner is a state, the list of its functions is somewhat different, with the main task of 
such financial intermediaries being financing projects that for certain reasons can not be financed by private 
investment capital, but the effect of their implementation for society as a whole should be positive. 
On the basis of summarizing world experience of functioning of banks with state participation within national 
economies and banking systems around the world we offer are two models of operation of such banks by their 
functional load in the economic system and targets: 
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1. Model 1. It is envisaged that state-owned banks operate on a general basis with other commercial banks, 
carry out the same list of operations, but in some cases are oriented to servicing certain sectors of the economy 
or economic activities. Within this model, such banks are formed as a result of the nationalization of some 
troubled banks as a means of preserving the financial stability of the banking system in times of crisis, due to 
historically established traditions and political ideology, etc..  
2. Model 2. Banks with state participation occupy a completely separate place in the banking system, perform 
exclusively the functions of financial agents of the government in the implementation of national socio-
economic development programs. The list of operations and target benchmarks for such banks and ordinary 
commercial banks is very different in this case. Within this model, banks with public participation are formed 
specifically for specific tasks of implementing the state economic development strategy, not because of 
historical traditions or current conditions of post-crisis stabilization. 
The generalization of the world experience in the functioning of banks with state participation made it possible 
to assert that in virtually all countries where the state has a share in the capital of banks, they are created and 
operate according to the model. 
1. China, where this model has been operating since the early 1990s, is the only country in which state-owned 
banks are based on model 2 in its pure form. Partly on the way to the formation of model 2 are now Russia 
and India, but as the system of banks with state participation in these countries is now actively reformed, the 
only illustrative example of this model will be China. 
Consider the impact of banks with state participation in economic growth in the countries where the system 
of banks modeled on one. 
Most studies conducted by countries that form their banking system according to model 1 show the negative 
impact of state participation in the banking system of the country on economic growth and indicators of 
financial stability of the banking system. 
Thus, in particular, according to a study conducted on the example of 65 countries of the world, it is proved 
that the depth and scale of the effects of the crisis in general are positively correlated with the degree of state 
participation in the banking system. The research also confirms the negative impact of the state's participation 
in the banking sector on the characteristics of the country's financial and economic development. That is, 
countries with a significant level of state participation in the banking system, as a rule, have a lower level of 
development of the banking intermediation system, as well as lower rates of development of the non-financial 
sector of the economy and the stock market. 
It is advisable in this direction to consider the study on the impact of the increase of the share of state property 
in the financial sector on the example of 92 countries with different levels of economic development in the 
system of indicators proposed by T. Beck, N. Loyazi and R. Levit. According to the results of this study, it 
was found that an increase in the state's presence in the banking system is slowly hampering economic 
development (an increase in the share of the state in the banking system by 10% leads to a decline in the rate 
of economic development by 0.23%). Summarized results of this study are illustrated in tables 2 and 3. 
Table 2. Results of the analysis of the influence of the state participation in the banking system on the 
development of the economies of the countries where the system of banks with public participation is 
constructed according to model 1 
Dependent 
variables: 
 Explanatory Variables  
GB70 
Recorded 
GDP per 
capita in 
1960 
The initial volume 
of loans to 
households to GDP 
Initial amount 
of liquid credit 
obligations to 
GDP 
Initial amount of 
commercial 
bank assets to 
total assets 
Initial 
capitalization of 
the stock 
exchange to 
GDP 
The 
adjusted 
value R2 
Part 1: Financial development 
Growth of loans to 
households to GDP 
-0.0394a 
(0.0107) 
-0.0006 
(0.0043) 
-0.058a (0.0187)    0.2111 
[82] 
Growth of liquid liabil-
ities to GDP 
-0.0138c 
(0.0079) 
-0.0015 
(0.0028) 
 -0470a 
(0.0147) 
  0.2475 
[82] 
Growth of assets of 
commercial banks to 
total assets 
-0.0050 
(0.0048) 
0.0041c 
(0.0022) 
  -0.0741a (0.0178)  0.4456 
[82] 
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Table 2. Results of the analysis of the influence of the state participation in the banking system on the 
development of the economies of the countries where the system of banks with public participation is 
constructed according to model 1 
Dependent 
variables: 
 Explanatory Variables  
GB70 
Recorded 
GDP per 
capita in 
1960 
The initial volume 
of loans to 
households to GDP 
Initial amount 
of liquid credit 
obligations to 
GDP 
Initial amount of 
commercial 
bank assets to 
total assets 
Initial 
capitalization of 
the stock 
exchange to 
GDP 
The 
adjusted 
value R2 
Growth of stock market 
capitalization to GDP 
0.0071 
(0.0341) 
-0.0338b 
(0.0148) 
   -0.0760a 
(0.0254) 
0.2880 
[47] 
Changes in stock mar-
ket capitalization to 
GDP 
-0.5306a 
(0.1620) 
-0.0305 
(0.0411) 
   -0.1000 (0.3382) 0.1910 
[67] 
 Part 2: Access to credit resources 
Private requirements-re-
quirements of firms not 
included in the 20 largest 
to GDP 
-0.3153c 
(0.1749) 
-0.0231 
(0.0595) 
0.6118c  (0.3121)    0.3551 
[32] 
Availability of loans -0.5787b 
(0.2629) 
0.5152a 
(0.0914) 
0.2772 (0.2714)    0.4810 
[54] 
 Part 3: Efficiency of the banking system 
Variable cost of banks 
to total assets 
0.0232a 
(0.0067) 
-0.0012 
(0.0026) 
-0.0134 (0.0107)    0.1856 
[79] 
Effect of interest rate 22.2802a  
7.2241) 
4.1503 
(4.1113) 
-27.6439c (14.4694)    0.1539 
[58] 
 Part 4: Financial Stability 
Financial stability of 
banks 
-1.2416b 
(0.5205) 
0.7522a 
(0.1564) 
0.3818 (0.4794)    0.4387 
[54] 
Inflation rate 0.1198a 
0.0363) 
0.0095 
(0.0146) 
-0.0719 (0.0477)    0.1537 
[68] 
 Part 5: Capital Market 
Capitalization of the 
stock market in 1995 
-0.7411a 
(0.2058) 
0.0089 
(0.0422) 
    0.2570 
[70] 
Capitalization of the 
stock market in 1995 
-0.5409a 
(0.1762) 
-0.0343 
(0.0438) 
   0.9011a (0.3404) 0.5036 
[62] 
a - significance at the level of 1%; b - significance at the level of 5%; c - significance at the level of 10%. 
Table 3 - Regression equations of dependence of economic growth indicators and state participation in the 
banking system for different countries of the world in which the system of state-owned banks is based on model 1 
Dependent 
variables 
Explanatory Variables 
GB70 
Registered 
GDP 
per capita 
The initial 
volume of 
loans to 
households 
to GDP 
Initial amount 
of liquid credit 
obligations to 
GDP 
Initial volume 
commercial 
bank assets to 
total assets 
Initial 
capitalization of 
the stock 
exchange to 
GDP 
Average 
annual 
values 
The 
adjusted 
value R2 
GDP per capita 
in 1960-1995. 
-0.0235a 
(0.0077) 
-0.0065b 
(0.0032) 
   Initial capitaliza-
tion of the stock 
exchange to 
GDP 
 0.1240 
[85] 
GDP per capita 
in 1960-1995. 
-0.0199a 
(0.0071) 
-0.0160а 
(0.0033) 
    0.0061a 
(0.0013) 
0.3403 
[85] 
GDP per capita 
in 1960-1995. 
-0.0171b 
(0.0072) 
-0.0175а 
(0.0030) 
0.0302a 
(0.0103) 
   0.0055а 
(0.0012) 
0.4168 
[82] 
GDP per capita 
in 1960-1995. 
-0.0152c 
(0.0079) 
-0.0166a 
(0.0032) 
 0.0198а (0.0086)   0.0057a 
(0.0013) 
0.3835 
[82] 
GDP per capita 
in 1960-1995. 
-0.0180b 
(0.0084) 
-0.0160а 
(0.0037) 
  0.0026 
(0.0136) 
 0.0062а 
(0.0014) 
0.3216 
[83] 
GDP per capita 
in 1960-1995. 
-0.0160c 
(0.0082) 
-0.0134а 
(0.0034) 
   0.0146b (0.0014) 0.0050а 
(0.0014) 
0.3028 
[75] 
GDP per capita 
in 1960-1995. 
-0.0140c 
(0.0083) 
-0.0151a 
(0.0032) 
0.0263b 
(0.0105) 
  0.0107 (0.0084) 0.0047а 
(0.0013) 
0.3671 
[73] 
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a - significance at the level of 1%; b - significance at the level of 5%; c - significance at the level of 10%. Standard errors are shown 
in brackets. 
We should provide a thorough study on the BRIC countries, 2001-2009. As a result, it was concluded that 
there is no statistically significant influence of state presence on the indicators of depth and structural 
characteristics of national banking mediation. It is proved that state participation at the present stage of 
development of BRIC countries does not have a negative impact on the level of banking mediation and the 
main indicators of economic growth. The main results of this study are illustrated in Table. 4 
At the same time, in all BRIC countries, the banking system is modeled on model 2 in its pure form. Thus, in 
particular, according to expert estimates, Indian state banks hold slightly less than 80% of the total loan 
portfolio of the whole banking system of the country. Although there is a slight tendency to reduce the share 
of the public sector in the country's financial system, it does not, according to experts, decline below 55-65%.  
Table 4. Summarized results of the study of the influence of the share of banks with state participation in the 
banking system of the country on the indicators of economic development of these countries 
 
Dependent variable 
Study period 
  (country of study) 
1995-2002 
(Brazil, China, 
India, indonesia 
Mexico, Pakistan) 
2001-2009 (Brazil, 
  Russia, India, China) 
Assets / GDP 0 -0,097081 
[0,019731] 
Loans / GDP 0 0 
Deposits / GDP 1,982113 
[0,561883] 
0 
Loans to the state sector / GDP 0 0 
Private sector loans / GDP 0 0 
Interest margin 0 0 
Consumer loans / Assets 1,108594 
[0,288735] 
- 
Reserves for loans / Assets 0 - 
Inactive loans / Assets 0 - 
Money Mass / Money base 0 - 
Deposits on demand / Term deposits 0 - 
Money / [Money + Quasi Money] - 0 
Notes: 0 - No statistically significant effect. [] - Standard error. * - With a 10% significance level. «-» - no data. 
Thus, the banking systems of Brazil, India and Russia are moving towards a Chinese format for the 
construction of the banking system, but this path is not yet complete. They have already moved away from 
the construction of a system of banks with state participation in model 1, but in its pure form, model 2 has not 
yet come closer. The main issue that they still have to deal with is the implementation of government programs 
to support the national economy through state-owned banks. 
As far as China is concerned, it has been moving since 1979 to the modern organization of the banking system. 
During this period, a system of political banks was created (specialized banks issuing funds to support state 
economic policy), a system of state commercial banks (serving as a financial support to the reform process in 
China, gradually achieving these goals, these banks become more independent self-sustaining structures, 
administrative control over their activities is reduced), and commercial banks. 
Currently, the banking system of China's dominant role played by the four major banks ( "Big Four"), owned 
by the state, they own more than 75% of banking system assets. According to research, the state controls more 
than 90% of the assets of the banking system. 
China is the only country in the world where today's system of purely state-owned banks is based on model 
2. At the same time, unfortunately, there is currently no solid research on this country separately and not of 
all BRIC countries that would formalize the impact of state capital in the banking system on the pace of 
economic development in a given country. Therefore, below we will conduct such an author's research. 
Based on these data, we constructed regressive dependencies: 
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 GDP per capita from assets of state-owned banks in China; 
  the rate of GDP growth from assets of state-owned banks in China. As a control variable, in this case, the 
volume of export was used; 
 share of exports in GDP from the indicator of the share of state-owned banks in the assets of the banking 
sector in China. 
In summary, the results of research carried out by us demonstrated in the table 5. 
Table 5. Summarized results of author's study of the influence of state capital in the banking system of 
China on the pace of economic development (in brackets the standard error is given) 
Inde-pendent 
variables 
Dependent variables 
GDP per capita GDP growth rate Export share in GDP 
Coefficient 
with 
independent 
variable 
t-statistics 
Probability 
of obtaining 
a casual 
result 
Coefficient 
with 
independent 
variable 
t-statistics 
The proba-bility 
of getting a ran-
dom result 
Coeffi-
cient with 
inde-
pendent 
variable 
t-statistics 
The proba-
bility of 
getting a 
random 
result 
Assets of state-
owned banks 
8.002389 
(0.188248) 42.50989 0.0000 
0.024521 
(0.008041) 3.049358 0.0555    
Export 
volumes    
0.157011 
(0.056479) 2.779994 0.0690    
A set of assets 
of state-owned 
banks in the as-
sets of the 
banking sys-
tem 
      0.316433 (0.048994) 6.458596 0.0007 
FDI (net 
inflows)       
3.827545 
(0.801593) 4.774925 0.0031 
Number of 
observatios 8 5 8 
Study period 2008-2015 2009-2015 2008-2015 
Deter-
mination 
coefficient 
0.973839 0.914785 0.808449 
Adjusted 
determi-nation 
factor 
0.973839 0.886380 0.776524 
Standard error 
regression 187.0868 0.604203 2.174436 
Amount of 
residual 
squares 
245010.3 1.095184 28.36904 
Akaike 
Criterion 13.41749 2.119362 4.603734 
Schwarz 
criterion 13.42742 1.963137 4.623594 
Darwin-
Watson 
Criterion 
1.403434 1.343619 2.907218 
Analyzing data, shown in Table 5, we will focus mainly on the coefficient sign with independent variables. 
For all three regression dependences we construct, the coefficients are positive. indicating a positive effect of 
the assets of state banks on the indicators of economic growth in China: GDP per capita. the GDP growth rate 
and the share of exports in GDP. The regression dependences we have constructed are adequate. and 
conclusions. made on their basis - quite fair. because: 
 t-statistics for each coefficient - more critical; 
 The probability of error is very low: for the I and III equations - about 0%. for the II equation - 5-6%. This 
means. that probability of accidental reception of dependence is extremely small; 
 The adjusted determination coefficient is very high for all three equations (97%, 89% and 78% 
respectively). which testifies to that. that the change of the dependent variable (per capita GDP, the GDP 
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growth rate and the share of exports in GDP) is precisely due to the change in the independent variable (assets 
of state-owned banks). 
So the construction of a system of banks with state participation, according to model 2, contributes to 
economic growth (which proves the dependence of GDP per capita on assets of state-owned banks). an 
increase in its pace (as evidenced by the dependence of the GDP growth rate on the assets of state banks) and 
the growth of export-oriented country (as evidenced by the dependence of the share of exports in GDP from 
assets of state-owned banks). 
Conclusions 
In the study of the influence of state capital in the banking system on economic growth, a sample of countries 
should be formed not in the light of differences in the scale of state participation and levels of economic 
development of countries. but based on the specifics of building a financial sector in these countries and 
functions. which are executed by state banks. Functioning of state-owned banks on the example of China. In 
the study of the influence of state capital in the banking system on economic growth, a sample of countries 
should be formed not in the light of differences in the scale of state participation and levels of economic 
development of countries. but based on the specifics of building a financial sector in these countries and 
functions. which are executed by state banks. Functioning of state-owned banks on the example of China. 
When they occupy a completely separate place in the banking system. perform exclusively functions of 
financial agents of the government and differ from private banks according to the list of operations and target 
benchmarks. can provide a positive impact on the country's economic development. 
The analysis showed. that such studies often give absolutely opposite results. The reason for this is seen by 
the authors that the sample of countries in these models is formed mainly taking into account differences in 
the level of state participation and levels of economic development of countries. The error of this approach is 
proved because it does not take into account the specifics of building a financial sector in these countries and 
functions which are executed by state banks. It is proposed to group countries in conducting such studies. 
proceeding from that. according to what principle state banks function in them:  
1) State-owned banks operate on a common basis with other banks. carry out the same list of operations. but in 
some cases, focused on servicing specific sectors of the economy;  
2) State banks occupy a completely separate place in the banking system. carry out exclusively functions of finan-
cial agents of the government in the implementation of national programs of socio-economic ro-tion. the list of 
operations and target benchmarks for such banks and private banks is significantly different. 
In most countries, where the state has a stake in the capital of banks, they are created and operate on the first 
principle. The authors relied on the results of research by IMF and World Bank experts. which proved the 
negative influence of state banks on economic growth and the level of development of national economies in 
these countries. 
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Appendix 
Table 1. Summary results of the study stabilization function of public banks in the economy 
Variables and statistical characteristics 
Coefficients of independent variables in regression equations in the model 
of dependence of the volume of loans in the country's economy on the 
respective independent variables 
Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3  Equation 4 
Logarithm of loans 1,002*** 
(0.000) 
0,998*** 
(0.000) 
0,994*** 
(0.000) 
0,991*** 
(0.000) 
GDP growth per capita 0.020*** 
(0.000) 
0.020*** 
(0.000) 
0.017*** 
(0.000) 
0.017*** 
(0.000) 
A fictitious variable that determines the participation of the state in the cap-
ital of banks (Fictitious change of state banks is equal to 1, if the bank is in 
state ownership with a controlling interest) 
0.047** 
(0.022) 
0.054** 
(0.037) 
0.053*** 
(0.006) 
0.059*** 
(0.002) 
GDP growth rate per capita * A fictitious variable that determines the par-
ticipation of the state in the capital of banks 
-0.013*** 
(0.000) 
-0.014*** 
(0.000) 
-0.011*** 
(0.000) 
-0.011*** 
(0.001) 
Effectiveness of the government (the quality of public services index, the 
quality of civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressure, the quality of policy development and implementation, and the 
credibility of such a government policy) 
  -0.050 
(0.120) 
-0.048 
(0.161) 
GDP growth per capita * Fictitious variable determining the state's partici-
pation in bank capital * Efficiency of government 
  -0.005** 
(0.027) 
-0.004 
(0.105) 
Assets (the logarithm of the total assets in the constants of $ 2,000) -0.007 
(0.508) 
-0.003 
(0.806) 
-0.001 
(0.947) 
0.001 
(0.869) 
Capital to Assets 0.069 
(0.350) 
0.040 
(0.778) 
-0.018 
(0.797) 
-0.034 
(0.658) 
Loans to Assets  -0.080 
(0.375) 
 -0.055 
(0.115) 
Exclusivity (ratio of liquid assets to total assets)  0.045 
(0.772) 
 0.018 
(0.681) 
Deposits to liabilities  0.041 
(0.453) 
 0.025 
(0.278) 
Cooperative banks (a fictitious variable equal to 1, if the bank is co-opera-
tive, and 0 - otherwise) 
 0.048** 
(0.013) 
 0.053*** 
(0.001) 
Mortgage banks (a fictitious variable equal to 1, if the bank is mortgage, 
and 0 - otherwise) 
 0.012 
(0.583) 
 0.013 
(0.545) 
Savings banks (fictitious variable equal to 1 if the bank is a savings, and 0 
- otherwise) 
 0.026 
(0.232) 
 0.010 
(0.497) 
GDP per capita (in thousands of constants, $ 2,000 at constant prices) -0.001** 
(0.022) 
-0.001 
(0.369) 
0.001 
(0.618) 
0.001 
(0.642) 
Inflation (the rate of change of GDP deflator) -0.004*** 
(0.000) 
-0.004*** 
(0.010) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.004*** 
(0.000) 
Number of observations 6181 6081 5218 5132 
Number of banks 1633   1609 1506 1483 
Number of tools 272 278   352 358 
AR test 0.508 0.611 0.933 0.841 
OIR is the p-significance test of Hansen 0.200 0.269 0.818 0.847 
Notes: All regression equations are analyzed using a two-stage GMM estimation system with Windmeijer correction. The P-value for 
standard errors is shown in brackets. *, **, *** denote significance by 10%, 5% and 1%. 
